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SUMMARY
This paper suggests that, under the Clean Water Act of 2002,1 Na-
tive American tribal areas increasingly will be subject to state-imposed
water quality standards and management plans. The following premises
support this suggestion:
• Across the United States, streams, rivers, lakes, and estuaries
are impaired to an unacceptable degree. 2
• This impairment results from the insufficiency of the technol-
ogy-based controls of nonpoint sources mandated by the Clean
Water Act.3
" Given this failure, it will be necessary to impose water quality-
based standards. 4
• For this purpose, the watershed planning and management provi-
sions of section 303 of the Clean Water Act will be instituted.5
• Such watershed planning and management will encompass tribal
areas.
• Two scenarios are foreseeable:
1. Tribes will not have their own water quality standards and
management plans in place, and states will feel obligated to
impose their own standards and planning requirements on
the tribes; or
2. Tribes will institute their own standards and plans, but they
will be inconsistent with those of the state. Hence, harmoni-
zation of state and tribal water standards will be necessary.
The federal Clean Water Act allows Indian tribes to be treated as
though they were states for the purposes of the Act.6 However, signifi-
cant obstacles face tribes that seek.treatment-as-state status. States may
I Clean Water Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387 (2002).
2 See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 23 HARv. EN VTL. L. REv. 203, 203 (1999).
3 See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying discussion.
4 See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying discussion.
5 Id.
6 Clean Water Act § 518(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2002).
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challenge tribal jurisdiction in court7 and through the political branches
of government. 8
Tribes that remain undeterred by these obstacles would be well-
served by preparing and adopting their own water quality standards and
planning. Such plans would serve as a basis for harmonizing state and
tribal standards and would meet the interests of both states and tribes.
INTRODUCTION
Environmental law in the United States continues to develop
through "environmental federalism." 9 Until recently, since the 1970s,
the federal government has dominated environmental protection in the
United States. This federalization was motivated by the "long history of
state failure to protect what had come to be viewed as nationally impor-
tant interests."' 10 This failure prompted the federal government to enact
legislation to provide a cohesive and coherent body of environmental
law:" 1
First, the history of environmental regulation demonstrates that state
regulation has been uneven and unreliable, a situation that is not likely to
improve as environmental issues become more difficult, and hence more
controversial and expensive, to resolve. Second, many remaining envi-
ronmental problems, such as nonpoint source pollution and coastal pollu-
tion, are difficult in part precisely because they require coordination at a
multi-state, watershed, or regional level; individual state regulation is
simply insufficient.' 2
That coordination is essential in environmental law, especially
given "our commitment to decentralized government and federalism, di-
viding sovereign responsibilities between the federal, state, tribal, and, to
a lesser extent, local governmental entities."'13 Dealing with the frag-
mentation that can result from division of responsibilities in the environ-
mental context is a challenge for water law generally, and for the Clean
Water Act in particular. It presents special difficulties for Indian tribes
in part because of the potential for competing jurisdictional interests of
the states and the federal government. These difficulties could increase
7 See infra notes 182-98 and accompanying discussion.
8 See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying discussion.
9 Dean B. Suagee & John P. Lowndes, Due Process and Public Participation in Tribal
Environmental Programs, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (1999).
10 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995).
11 See id.
12 ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONsTrTUTON: LEGAL
STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 3-4 (2004).
13 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 30 (2004).
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if the current trend towards environmental federalism tips the balance of
responsibility back from the federal government to the states. 14
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A. ORIGINS OF THE CWA IN THE FWPCA
The passage of the Federal Water Pollution and Control Act
(FWPCA) amendments specifically reflected the extension of federal in-
tervention into water pollution controls to fill "the gaps in pollution con-
trol, to which local efforts either could not or would not respond
effectively." 15 Implementation of the Water Quality Act of 196516 and
the Clean Water Restoration Act of 196617 primarily relied on coopera-
tive compliance, using grants as incentives to states interested in improv-
ing water quality.' 8 Unfortunately, this was ineffective. 19
Prior to 1970, for example, the Secretary of the Interior had initiated
only fifty enforcement actions, only one of which went to court.20
Hence, five years after the passage of the Water Quality Act, "most of
the rivers that were dirty at the time of its passage were not "'discernibly
cleaner.' "21
In addition to the difficulties associated with dependence on volun-
tary compliance, another important reason for this failure was that the
FWPCA relied on ambient water quality standards as the basis for con-
trolling pollution. 22 Three factors contributed to the ineffectiveness of
this ambient water quality standards program.23 First, water quality stan-
dards focused on the effects of water pollution rather than its causes; 24
second, responsibility for the program was awkwardly divided between
state and federal governments;2 5 and third, the enforcement procedures
were "cumbrous. '26 Therefore, to restore the nation's rivers, lakes and
estuaries, "[f]ederal superintendence was viewed as the cure for frag-
14 Percival, supra note 10, at 1165.
15 N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality. Part
III: The Federal Effort, 52 IOWA L. REv. 799, 860 (dated incorrectly as 1957, actually pub-
lished in 1967).
16 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
17 Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966).
18 See Water Quality Act of 1965 § 3, 79 Stat. at 905-06; Clean Water Restoration Act
of 1966 § 201(a), 80 Stat. at 1246.
19 Envtl. Prot. Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
202 (1976).
20 Marc J. Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pollution, 83
HARv. L. REv. 1527, 1528 n.5 (1970).
21 Id. at 1529.
22 State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S.at 202.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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mented jurisdictions and uneven regulation. ' 27 The 1972 amendments to
the FWPCA were designed to provide such superintendence. 28
B. BASIC FUNCTION OF THE FWPCA AMENDMENTS OF 1972
The basic purpose of the FWPCA, now termed the Clean Water
Act, is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters. '29 The FWPCA attempts to achieve this
by regulating the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the United
States to ensure that designated uses of the waters can continue. 30 Such
uses include protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and other wild-
life, public water supplies, and various recreational, industrial, and agri-
cultural uses, "and also taking into consideration their use and value for
navigation."' 3I To ensure protection of these uses, a specific amount of
pollutants that can be discharged must be set.32 Water quality standards
or criteria are the mechanism by which this set level of acceptable pollu-
tion is determined. 33 Water quality standards are developed from scien-
tific data that ascertains what level of pollution, defined either by
numerical limits or narrative criteria, a body of water can tolerate while
still sustaining a given use.34 Thus it follows that the quality of regulated
discharges must be such that the standards of the receiving water bodies
are not compromised.
Under the FWPCA discharges are distinguished according to
whether they are point or nonpoint sources. 35 As defined under the Act,
a point source is "any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feed-
ing operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are
or may be discharged. '36 For these sources, the FWPCA "introduced a
variety of carrot and stick policies aimed at revolutionizing waste treat-
ment technologies and practices."' 37
27 A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed Management,
in NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 213, 213 (John Nolon ed.,
2003).
28 See State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 203.
29 Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2002).
30 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
31 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B).
35 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
36 Id.
37 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 16 (1986).
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Unfortunately, these policies failed to reach myriad minor point
sources of pollution such as small feedlots and stormwater sewers. 38 As
William Rodgers, Jr. put it, "It is clear that the NPDES [FWPCA's point
source] program runs up against some kind of impossibility theorem in
its aspirations to reach dischargers in the nethermost territory close to
nonpoint sources."139
In keeping with its focus on point source pollution, the Act fails to
specifically define nonpoint sources of pollution. 40 Instead, nonpoint
sources are implicitly defined with reference to point sources. For exam-
ple, agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture are specifically excluded from the definition of point sources
with the result that farm sources of pollution fall into the category of
nonpoint sources. 41 This category also includes runoff from paved areas,
and other sources of pollution not specifically defined as point sources. 42
The FWPCA is structured so as to achieve its purposes through fed-
eral-state partnerships. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
which administers the Act,43 is authorized to suspend its federal program
under the Act upon approving a state program.44 Thus, governors of
each state, desiring to administer their own programs for discharges into
navigable waters within their jurisdictions, can submit to EPA a descrip-
tions of their proposed programs together with affirmations that state
laws provide adequate authority for the programs. 45 Following EPA re-
view and approval, the state acquires permitting authority with associated
inspection and enforcement responsibilities, 46 while EPA retains respon-
sibility for oversight of the state program.47 The primary regulatory func-
tion of the state's program so approved is to control point discharges. 48
C. CURRENT INADEQUACIES OF THE CWA
The Act's emphasis on point source discharges has had a doubly
unfavorable consequence: nonpoint sources have remained unregulated,
and the emphasis on controlling chemicals from the "end of the pipe" has
thus come at the expense of "the overall health of water and aquatic
38 See id.
39 Id.
40 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362.
41 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
42 ROBERT W. COLLIN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: CLEANING UP
AMERICA'S ACT 23 (2006).
43 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d).
44 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c).
45 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g).
46 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(c), 1344(h)(2)(a).
47 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(c)(3), 1344(i).
48 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
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ecosystems. '49 Rights of use for water that is not drinkable, swimmable
or fishable are of little value. Unfortunately, that is the status of many of
the nation's waters.50 As Robert Adler noted a quarter century after the
passage of the Clean Water Act, significant problems of water pollution
prevail throughout the United States.5 '
EPA's National Water Quality Inventory Report to Congress in
2000 stated that about 40% of the assessed river and stream miles, 46%
of assessed lake areas and more than 50% of assessed estuarine square
miles failed to support designated water standards.5 2 These assessments
indicate that, as recently as 2000, close to 50% of the nation's waters are
impaired with respect one or more designated use. 53 These statistics reg-
ister the failure of the application of the Clean Water Act.
Scholars have noted the failures of the Clean Water Act. As Rod-
gers stated in 1986, "Measured against the standard of its own ambitions,
the Clean Water Act has not been a success. ' 54 Lawrence Bazel echoed
this verdict seventeen years later when he said, "[T]he act does not score
very highly when tested against its own goals and aspirations, even
though it is more than thirty years old." 55
This failure extends into Indian territory and affects the waters Indi-
ans share with the rest of the United States. Addressing the failure will
require the restoration and maintenance of the integrity of the nation's
waters-an unfinished task demanding "ingenuity, courage, innovation,
a few incentives, more regulations, more federal involvement, more pub-
lic education, and above all, a much more mature sense of civic responsi-
bility."' 56 This responsibility must fall to all communities within the each
watershed, including, as will be argued below, American Indian
communities.
49 Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without Solution: Flow Impairment Problems Under
Clean Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 215 (2005).
50 See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 203, 203 (1999).
51 Id.
52 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 2000 NATIONAL
WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 3 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/2000report/
execsum.pdf.
53 Id.
54 2 RODGERS, supra note 37, at 17.
55 Lawrence S. Bazel, The Clean Water Act at Thirty: A Failure After All These Years?
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 46, 46 (2003).
56 William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Water Act Been a Suc-
cess?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 593 (2004).
2007]
502 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:495
II. EMERGENCE OF CWA SECTION 303
(WATERSHED MANAGEMENT)
A. THE PRIMARY ROLE OF THE WATERSHED IN WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT
The watershed is the fundamental hydrological unit for managing
water. There are multiple alternate terms for this unit, including river
basin, catchment area, drainage area, gathering ground, hydrographic ba-
sin and waterscape. 57 In international law, the term watercourse system
is commonly used.58 In the United Nations Convention on the Law of
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse, watercourse is de-
fined as "a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by
virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing
into a common terminus. 59
This latter definition captures very well the concept of a watershed.
A watershed encompasses all components of the hydrological system,
including overland and sub-surface flows, groundwater, wetlands, lakes
and streams. 60 These components are interconnected. For example, di-
verting surface runoff may diminish groundwater resources; lower
groundwater levels can, in turn, cause wetlands to dry up and stream
flows to be seriously reduced or even extinguished.61 More broadly,
events and land uses in one part of a watershed can adversely affect the
quantity and quality of water elsewhere in the watershed. 62 For these
reasons, the watershed is the logical unit for the planning and manage-
ment of water resources.63
A watershed is a unitary drainage system.64 Hence, the alternative
term for a watershed is "drainage basin." 65 Following its deposition on
land through precipitation, water drains across or through the land.66 As
57 Keith S. Porter, Fixing our Drinking Water: From Field and Forest to Faucet, 23
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 394 (2006).
58 See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: NON-
NAVIGATIONAL USES 23-24 (2001).
59 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
art. 2(a), May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
60 Porter, supra note 57, at 394.
61 This description corresponds to the basic water balance equation in hydrology. See,
e.g., KEVIN HISCOCK, HYDROGEOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 278 (2006).
62 DANIEL P. LOUCKS & EELCO VANBEEK, WATER RESOURCES SYSTEMS PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS, MODELS AND APPLICATIONS 23 (2005).
63 Id.
64 Porter, supra note 57, at 393 (quoting COMMITTEE ON WATERSHED MANAGEMENT,
NEW STRATEGIES FOR AMERICA'S WATERSHEDS 5 (1999)).
65 Id. at 394 (quoting McGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS
2049 (Sybil Parker ed., 3d ed. 1984)).
66 LUNA B. LEOPALD, WATER, RIVERS AND CREEKS (1997), provides a very clear and
accessible summary of the basic hydrological processes in a watershed. A more advanced
treatment is given by DANIEL HILLEL, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOIL PHYSICS
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such, the drainage water is intimately connected to the land and soil.
Therefore, land uses have a significant impact on drainage water before it
reaches groundwater or other water bodies, such as streams.
The quantity of water may be changed by diversions from the hy-
drological paths that the drainage water would otherwise naturally fol-
low. Also, the quality of drainage water can be substantially impaired by
the addition of chemical, physical and biological constituents. These ad-
ditions, especially if they occur at unnatural levels as a result of human
activities, can readily amount to pollution. Thus, the quantity and quality
of water produced by a watershed depend upon land use management
within that watershed. 67
B. THE PROSPECT OF TMDLs
Addressing the broad range of impairments caused by land uses
"suggests the need for a comprehensive, watershed-based approach to
aquatic ecosystem restoration and protection to augment the nation's
water pollution control strategy. '68 The CWA provides for such an ap-
proach in section 303(d). EPA initially "took § 303(d) by the horns very
gently."'69 The consequence was inaction. EPA "delayed, soft-pedaled,
and understated the § 303(d) requirements to a remarkable degree."'70
However, the failure of the CWA to achieve its objectives refocused at-
tention on the potential role of § 303(d).
"Section 303 is central to the Act's carrot-and-stick approach to at-
taining acceptable water quality without direct federal regulation of
nonpoint sources of pollution."'71 Section 303(d) requires states or EPA
to identify those water bodies in which the discharge limitations required
by section 303(b)(1) are found to be insufficient to meet any applicable
standard. 72
For each standard not met, section 303(d)(1)(C) requires that the
state establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL) for that pollutant. 73
A TMDL "is a calculation of the maximum amount of a pollutant that a
waterbody can receive and still meet water quality standards, and an allo-
(2004). VLADIMIR NOVOTNY, WATER QUALITY: DIFFUSE POLLUTION AND WATERSHED MAN-
AGEMENT (2d ed. 2003), provides a comprehensive account of the causes of pollution of drain-
age waters.
67 See id.
68 Adler, supra note 2, at 204.
69 OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION 49 (2d ed. 2002).
70 Id. at 51.
71 Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002).
72 See Clean Water Act §§ 303(b)(1), (d), 33 U.S.C. §§1313(b)(1), (d) (2002).
73 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d)(l)(C).
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cation of that amount to the pollutant's sources."' 74 Determining a
TMDL requires estimating all the point and nonpoint sources in the wa-
tershed of the waterbody in question.75 This estimation represents a
summation of all the point loads, termed the waste load allocation, and
nonpoint loads, termed the load allocation.76
The final TMDL is the sum of the waste load allocation and the load
allocation plus a specified margin of safety to allow for uncertainty in the
estimation of the loads.77 In practice, this procedure is driven by the
specific need to set water quality objectives that are then sought by ap-
plying load restrictions on all significant point and nonpoint sources. 78
According to Nina Bell, "we have the citizens' group litigation to
thank for delivering the TMDL program to the United States."' 79 Bell
noted that, as of 2001, twenty citizen actions had been taken in eighteen
states; the consequence being that EPA was under court orders to estab-
lish TMDLs in those various states.80
TMDLs have provoked a great deal of hostility as demonstrated by
the immense volume of negative responses to EPA regulations proposing
to develop TMDLs to remedy pollution in 1999.81 These opponents in-
cluded landowners and farmers. Their objections are well-illustrated by
American Farm Bureau Federation v. Whitman (filed July 18, 2000).82
Citizen groups brought lawsuits in thirty-eight states seeking to establish
the duty of EPA to take action under section 303(d).83 "Citizen suit law
is the engine that propels the field of environmental law."'84 To this as-
sertion, TMDLs are no exception.
74 EPA, Introduction to TMDLs, TMDL Definition, http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/in-
tro.html#definition (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
75 Id.
76 See Mary E. Christopher, Time to Bite the Bullet: A Look at State Implementation of
Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) Under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act, 40
WASHBURN L.J. 480, 484 (2001).
77 EPA, Overview of Current TMDL, http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewfs.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
78 See, e.g., WU-SENG LUNG, WATER QUALITY MODELING FOR WASTELOAD ALLOCA-
TIONS AND TMDLs (2001).
79 Nina Bell, Keynote Address at the Public Land and Resources Law Review Confer-
ence, TMDLs at a Crossroads: Driven by Litigation, Derailed by Controversy?, 22 PuB. LAND
& RESOURCES L. REV. 61, 62 (2001).
80 Id. at 63.
81 Id. at 65.
82 American Farm Bureau Federation v. Whitman, Nos. 00-1320, 001341, 00-1353 and
00-1384 (D.C. Cir. consolidated) (filed July 18, 2000).
83 Bell, supra note 79, at 62; see also HoUCK, supra note 69, at 51.
84 James R. May, Now More than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 ENVT.
L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 10704, 10706 (2003).
GOOD ALLIANCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS
C. THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF INTEGRATED WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT
The CWA section 303(d)(1)(A) requires states to identify those wa-
ters within their state boundaries where technology-based requirements
on the point-source discharges are insufficient "to implement any water
quality standard applicable to such waters. '85 This requirement appears
to omit nonpoint sources. Such omission was the primary issue in Pron-
solino v. Nastri.86 This case considered the question: does EPA have
authority, under section 303(d) of the CWA, to establish a TMDL for a
river that was only subject to nonpoint sources? 87 The Court answered in
the affirmative. 88 It further affirmed a state's ability to require a permit
that contains provisions designed to meet a TMDL by reducing loading
from a nonpoint source.89
This incorporation of nonpoint sources within the reach of CWA
section 303 has a critical consequence for water quality protection.
Nonpoint sources are a direct result of farming and other land uses, and
human activities on the land. 90 Therefore, management of these
nonpoint sources, as required by the TMDL process, equates to compre-
hensive land management to protect water bodies. 91 Unfortunately, there
are few examples of successful comprehensive watershed management
conducted in order to satisfy TMDLs.
The New York City Watershed Program serves as an outstanding
national and even international example of comprehensively integrated
watershed management. 9 293 Delaware County, New York comprises
about 50% of the nearly two thousand square miles that make up the
New York City watershed. 94 In 1999, the County adopted its Delaware
County Action Plan (DCAP).95 The overall aim of DCAP is to protect
the integrity of the water supply of New York City.9 6 This aim is
achieved through the County Departments of Planning, Public Works,
85 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(l)(A) (2001).
86 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
87 Id. at 1126.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1140.
90 See generally Keith S. Porter, Protecting a 'Necessity of Life': Water Supplies Pro-
tected at Their Watershed Source, 14 J. WATER L. 61, (2003).
91 Christopher, supra note 76, at 530-31.
92 There is a prolific literature describing the New York City Watershed. See, e.g.,
Porter, supra note 57.
93 See id. at 391.
94 Id. at 390-91.
95 DELAWARE COUNTY AcrnON PLAN (DCAP) (adopted as DEL. COUNTY BD. OF SUPER-
VISORS RES. No. 229 (1999)), available at http://www.co.delaware.ny.us/depts/h2o/docs/
dcap.pdf.
96 See id. at 5-6.
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and Economic Development, the County Soil and Water Conservation
District, and Cornell Cooperative Extension. Cornell University and
other state, federal and New York City partners provide scientific and
institutional support to the program. 97 The components of the program
principally include: animal manure and farm nutrient management;
county-wide planning; on-site wastewater treatment; community
stormwater and highway drainage; stream corridor protection and reha-
bilitation; composted municipal waste and manure; economic and land
development; and scientific support through monitoring, mathematical
modeling and research. 98
The experience of Delaware County in the New York City Water-
shed Program demonstrates the scale and scope of what is required to
meet TMDL targets. Notably, Delaware County is largely rural and
maintains a small population. 99 It is also one of the poorest counties in
New York State. Its median household income in 1999 was $32,461, the
eighth lowest of the sixty-two counties in the state. 100 A key aspect of
the success of DCAP is the manner in which it sought, and sustainsthen
was able to sustain, institutional support at all levels. 10'
A leading example of watershed management in the West, bearing
some similarities to DCAP, is the Lake Tahoe Watershed Program. 10 2
This program also demonstrates the necessity for "decentralized, collabo-
rative approaches to resource management." 10 3 Inter-jurisdictional coop-
eration is an essential component of comprehensive watershed
management and is especially important in the West where it is neces-
sary to defeat the deficiencies of the West's fundamentally ungovernable
"box-shaped jurisdictions." lo4
97 See Porter, supra note 57, at 413.
98 Id. at 413-19.
99 According to the census, the population of Delaware County was 43,540 in 1960.
RICHARD L. FORSTALL (U.S. CENSUS BUREAU), NEW YORK POPULATION OF COUNTIES BY DE-
CENNIAL CENSUS: 1900 TO 1990, http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ny190090.txt.
The census bureau estimated the population in 2006 to be 46,977. Delaware County
QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/
36025.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
100 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS, AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION & U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING (2000), available at http://
factfinder.census.gov (search "Delaware County, New York" in "Get a Fact Sheet for Your
Community").
101 See Porter, supra note 57, at 420-21.
102 See Mark T. Imperial and Derek Kauneckis, Moving from Conflict to Collaboration:
Watershed Governance in Lake Tahoe, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1009, 1010 (2003).
103 Id.
104 Ann J. Morgan, Perspectives of a Manager of the "Pasturage Lands Between": Com-
paring Current Notions of Community Based Watershed Groups with Powell's Proposal for
Hydrographic Districts, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 25, 26 (2003).
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Recognizing this necessity for inter-jurisdictional cooperation posed
by the CWA raises the question: what is the role of the American Indian
tribes within the scope of the Act?
III. OMISSION OF TRIBES FROM THE CWA
Environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s largely omitted Indian
Tribes. 10 5 The Clean Water Act was no exception, and tribal areas, or as
frequently termed, "Indian country,"' 1 6 therefore did not fall within the
scope of the CWA. 10 7 Rodgers suggests that this was due to congres-
sional staffers' ignorance of Indian law.' 0 8 Regardless of the reason for
it, the omission left open the question of how the FWPCA would apply
to Indian reservations in practice.
Today, concern about "rapid development of Indian reservations"
and the consequent risk of pollution'0 9 could prompt states to seek juris-
diction over the tribal lands and waters. 1" 0 Lynne Petros suggests that
sections of the 1972 FWPCA could be "interpreted to allow delegation of
jurisdiction [over tribes] to the states."I'I These include:
Section 303, on submission by the state to the Adminis-
trator of water quality standards; Section 306(c), author-
izing the state to develop a procedure for enforcing
standards of performance for new sources; Section
308(c), authorizing the development of procedures for
inspection, monitoring and entry of point sources; and
105 Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Self-Determination and Environmental Federalism: Cultural
Values as a Force for Sustainability, 3 WIDENER L. SyMP. J. 229, 232 (1998) ("In the 1970s,
Congress enacted a host of environmental statutes, most of which either ignored Indian tribes
altogether or barely mentioned them.").
106 "Indian country" means:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, includ-
ing rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian commu-
nities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a
State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976).
107 See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State: The Penobscot
Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 816 (2004).
108 Id. (noting that an exception to congressional "oversight" was the 1976 Resource Con-
servation & Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006), that provided for treating tribes
as municipalities).
109 Lynne E. Petros, The Applicability of the Federal Pollution Acts to Indian Reserva-
tions: A Case for Tribal Self-Government, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 63 (1976).
1 10 Id. at 64. EPA recognized the omission and began confronting the congressional over-
sight in the 1970s. See James M. Grijalva, The Origins of the EPA's Indian Program, 15 KAN.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 209-94 (2006) [hereinafter Origins].
III Petros, supra note 109, at 77.
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Section 208, requiring each state to identify areas having
substantial water quality problems.112
However, Petros concludes that, given the absence of express lan-
guage in the FWPCA giving jurisdiction to the states over Indian reser-
vations, assumption of jurisdiction "violates basic principles of Indian
law."' 13
Since the origin of the CWA, EPA has been convinced that the act
did not give states jurisdiction over tribal reservations. 114 EPA's position
in Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA reflects that understand-
ing."15 In 1982, the State of Washington sought approval from EPA to
treat Indian activities on trust and tribal lands as within the scope of its
hazardous waste program under the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 1 6
Washington state's application presumed that it, as a state, had au-
thority to regulate hazardous waste-related activities of Indians on reser-
vation lands.' 17 Following review and public comment, EPA approved
the application for authorization "except as to Indian Lands." 118 EPA
took the position that the State had not demonstrated that it had legal
authority to exercise jurisdiction over Indian Lands. 1 9 On the contrary,
EPA determined that RCRA failed to give Washington jurisdiction over
Indian lands. 120 EPA concluded that such jurisdiction could only be con-
ferred through an express act of Congress or by treaty. 121 Following
EPA's reasoning, because Washington had no independent authority for
its jurisdictional claim, EPA retained the jurisdiction on Indian lands. 122
The Ninth Circuit approved EPA's interpretation of the RCRA as failing
to grant jurisdiction to states over the activities of Indians on their reser-
vations.123 The court reaffirmed that the retention by EPA of regulatory
authority "can promote the ability of the tribes to govern themselves by
allowing them to participate in hazardous waste management."'' 24
Despite the holding in Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA,
the status of Tribes under the FWCPA remained unclear after the deci-
sion. In particular, tribes could not assume that they were immune from
112 Id.
113 Id. at 93.
114 Grijalva, supra note 110, at 282.
115 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
116 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006).
117 Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1467.
118 Id.
'19 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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the Act. 125 Indeed, pressure on Congress to take a more explicit position
appeared to grow. In the early 1980s, Americans for Indian Opportunity
conducted a survey of reservations conducted under EPA auspices. 126
The report, based on forty-eight reservations that responded to the
survey, found major deficiencies in water quality, management of solid
and hazardous wastes, and treatment and disposal of wastewater.127 The
survey found that only eight reservations had their own water quality
standards for reservation streams and lakes.' 2 8 Low levels of oxygen,
fecal coliform bacteria, eutrophication, and sediment impaired waterbo-
dies on many of the reservations.129 The study discovered violations of
standards governing drinking water quality on seventeen of the forty-
eight reservations. 30 Nine reservations reported outbreaks of water-
borne diseases during the five years prior to the survey.' 3' Incursions on
tribal sovereignty in the context of environmental law became increas-
ingly likely as Indian reservations became serious sources of
pollution. 132
The undecided question facing tribes was if and how they could
determine their own pollution controls. In 1970, President Richard
Nixon advocated for allowing tribes to exercise their right to control and
operate federal programs, thus introducing the "Self-Determination
Era."' 33 However, it was unclear how such self-determination was to
apply in this newly developing body of environmental law.
In seeking an answer, Leigh Price proved to be "a great friend and
tireless advocate for tribes." 134 In 1977, EPA invited Price to join EPA.
Then, in 1983, the federal government issued a policy statement to its
agencies directing them to encourage tribal self-government, 135 and EPA
125 See Judith V. Royster & Rory Snow Arrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Envi-
ronment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L.
REV. 581, 591 (1989) (noting that Indian Americans are not immune from generally applicable
federal laws).
126 EPA PUBL'N No. 100R86103, SURVEY OF AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION NEEDS ON RESERVATION LANDS: 1986 (1986).
127 Id. at v.
128 Id. at 7.
129 Id. at 8.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See Stephen M. Feldman, The Developing Test for State Regulatory Jurisdiction in
Indian Country: Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 561,
562-63 (1982).
133 William C. Galloway, Tribal Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act:
Protecting Traditional Cultural Uses, 70 WASH. L. REv. 177, 179 (1995).
134 AM. INDIAN ENVTL. OFF., TRIBAL PROGRAM UPDATE: SPRING-SUMMER 2006, at 16
(July 2006) [hereinafter TRIBAL PROGRAM UPDATE], available at http://www.epa.gov/indian/
pdfs/aieo-update-july06.pdf.
135 "Tribal governments, like state and local governments, are more aware of the needs
and desires of their citizens than is the Federal Government and should, therefore, have the
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responded quickly by adopting a new Indian policy in November
1984.136 Price was the major force in developing EPA's Indian policy
established in 1984.137 This policy and its implementation guidance de-
scribed EPA's government-to-government relationship with tribes and its
commitment to environmental protection for them. 138 The policy recog-
nized "[t]ribal governments as the primary parties for setting standards,
making environmental policy decisions, and managing [environmental]
programs ... consistent with Agency standards and regulations."' 139
Christine Todd Whitman reaffirmed EPA policy for the Administra-
tion of Environmental Programs on Indihn Reservations on July 11,
2001:
It is the purpose of this statement to consolidate and expand on ex-
isting EPA Indian Policy statements in a manner consistent with the
overall Federal position in support of Tribal "self-government" and
''government-to-government" relations between Federal and Tribal
Governments. 140
Price was also instrumental in forming EPA Indian Program and
National Tribal Operations Committee in 1994.141 This Committee, to-
gether with EPA's Indian Policy, were "firsts for a federal agency.'142
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTS
Congress finally addressed reservation waters in its 1987 amend-
ments to the CWA. 143 Section 518, in particular, sought to incorporate
primary responsibility for meeting those needs. The only effective way for Indian reservations
to develop is through tribal governments which are responsive and accountable to their mem-
bers." Statement on Indian Policy, Ronald Regan, (issued Jan. 24, 1983), available at http://
www.ihs.gov/AdminMngrResources/legislativeaffairs/documents/Statement-IndianPolicy-
1983.pdf.
136 Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,098 (Sept. 22, 1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.131)
[hereinafter EPA 1989 Indian Policy Amendments]; see also Envtl. Prot. Agency, News for
Release, EPA Reaffirms 20 Years of Partnership with Indian Tribes, Sept. 24, 2004, available
at http://www.epa.gov/tribalportallpdf/indian-policy-leavitt-pr.pdf.
137 TRIBAL PROGRAM UPDATE, supra note 134, at 16.
138 EPA 1989 Indian Policy Amendments, 54 Fed. Reg. at 39,098.
139 EPA, PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND WATER RESOURCES IN INDIAN COUNTRY: A
STRATEGY FOR EPATRIBAL PARTNERSHIP 3 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/owm/
pdfs/aggud.pdf.
140 Memorandum from Christine Todd Whitman, to All EPA Employees (July 11, 2001)
[hereinafter Whitman Memorandum], available at http://www.epa.gov/ne/govt/tribes/pol-
icy.html (reaffirming the EPA's commitment to the right of tribes as sovereign governments to
self determination).
141 TRIBAL PROGRAM UPDATE, supra note 134, at 16.
142 Id.
143 An Act to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101
Stat. 7 (1987).
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tribes into the CWA and encourage tribal participation.' 44 As Senator
Inouye stated,
All too often in the past, Congress has enacted broad na-
tional legislation without specifying the role to be played
by Indian tribes vis-A-vis the Federal and State govern-
ments. That has led to a lot of uncertainty, confusion,
and litigation and has hindered the execution of impor-
tant national policies on the Nation's Indian
reservations. 45
Section 518 authorizes EPA to treat an Indian tribe as a state if:
" The Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers;
" The functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the
management and protection of water resources which are held by
the Indian tribe, held by the United States in Trust for Indians,
held by a member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is
subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the
borders of an Indian reservation; and
* The Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Ad-
ministrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exer-
cised in a manner consistent with the terms of this chapter and of
all applicable regulations. 146
With the promulgation of this section, Congress apparently intended
to give tribes the same authority to set water quality standards as
states.147 Most importantly, the section notes that:
The Administrator shall, in promulgating such regula-
tions, consult affected States sharing common water
bodies and provide a mechanism for the resolution of
any unreasonable consequences that may arise as a result
of differing water quality standards that may be set by
States and Indian tribes located on common bodies of
water. Such mechanism shall provide explicit considera-
tion of relevant factors including, but not limited to, the
effects of differing water quality permit requirements on
upstream and downstream dischargers, economic im-
144 See ENV'T & NATURAL RES. POLICY Div. OF THE CONG RESEARCH SERV. OF THE
LIBRARY OF CONG. 100TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER QUALITY ACT OF
1987, at 487 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER QUALITY
ACT OF 1987].
145 Id.
146 Clean Water Act § 518(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2002).
147 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER QUALITY ACT OF 1987, supra note 144, at 376
(citing EPA 1989 Indian Policy Amendments, 54 Fed. Reg. at 39,098).
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pacts, and present and historical uses and quality of the
waters subject to such standards. Such mechanism
should provide for the avoidance of such unreasonable
consequences in a manner consistent with the objectives
of this chapter.' 48
EPA recognized a need to develop criteria to assess tribal prepared-
ness to administer such important environmental programs. 149 Tribes
would have to demonstrate that they were able to administer their own
programs before EPA would hand over control. 150
Section 518 authorizes tribes to apply for treatment-as-states (TAS)
under a variety of sections in the CWA.' 51 Tribes may apply for TAS
grants for research, training, and reports on water quality.152 More con-
troversially, section 518 also allows them to apply for grants for water
quality programs under section 303(c). 153 Many tribes choose to apply
for grants under these provisions in order to assess their reservation wa-
ters in terms of determining both the boundaries of those waters and their
quality. 154
The standards are not the same for tribes applying for TAS under
section 303(c) as they are for tribes applying under other sections be-
cause EPA is more lenient with respect to tribal grants than water quality
programs. 155 As a result, some tribes might opt to apply under the other
sections before they apply for water quality standards programs because
they want to develop a more comprehensive understanding of their wa-
ters. In the alternative, a tribe may decide that it never wants to develop
a water quality standards program, and only wishes to seek money under
the other programs. Of course, a tribe with its own resources might
choose a third way: bypassing the other funding and seeking only TAS
under section 303(c).
148 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See id. (referencing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281, 1254, 1256, 1313, 1315, 1318, 1319, 1324,
1329, 1341, 1342, 1344, and 1346).
152 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1324(b).
153 Id.
154 By evaluating their waters under the TAS program, tribes can obtain federal funding
to finance these activities.
155 See GAO, INDIAN TRIBES: EPA SHOULD REDUCE THE REVIEW TIME FOR TRIBAL RE-
QUESTS TO MANAGE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 11 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; see
also EPA Guidance May Speed Creation of Tribal Water Quality Standards, WATER POLICY
REPORT, June 12, 2006, Vol. 15, No. 12 (available through Environmental NewsStand at In-
sideEPA.com) [hereinafter WATER POLICY RE'ORT] ("The [tribal] source says it is 'a little
easier' to get TAS for programmatic sections-such as section 106-than it is to get TAS
approval for regulatory sections-such as section 303.").
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A. ACCEPTANCE BY TRIBES: WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
Water quality standards are the foundation of the Clean Water
Act.156 Under section 303, states (and tribes with TAS) have the princi-
pal responsibility for establishing water quality standards.157 EPA's own
rule, 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a), provides that "EPA is to review and to ap-
prove or disapprove State-adopted water quality standards."' 158 The re-
view involves a determination of:
(1) Whether the State has adopted water uses which are
consistent with the requirements of the Clean Water Act;
(2) Whether the State has adopted criteria that protect the
designated water uses;
(3) Whether the State has followed its legal procedures
for revising or adopting standards;
(4) Whether the State standards which do not include the
uses specified in section 101(a)(2) of the Act are based
upon appropriate technical and scientific data and analy-
ses; and
(5) Whether the State submission meets the requirements
included in § 131.6 of [the Water Quality Standards
Regulations]. 159
EPA reviews the state (or tribe) water quality standards program, and if it
determines that it meets those the five factors of section 303(c), EPA will
approve that program. 160
156 See generally Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2002).
157 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(b).
158 Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a) (2005).
159 Id.
160 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(b). In addition to the section 303(c) requirements imposed on states,
tribes wishing to administer a water quality standards program must comply with additional
requirements. A tribe must meet the following additional criteria:
1. The Indian Tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior and meets the
definitions in §131.3(k);
2. The Indian Tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental
duties and powers;
3. The water quality standards program to be administered by the Indian Tribe
pertains to the management and protection of water resources which are within
the borders of the Indian reservation and held by the Indian Tribe, and held by
the United States in trust for Indians, within the borders of the Indian reservation
and held by a member of the Indian Tribe if such property interest is subject to a
trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of the Indian res-
ervation; and
4. The Indian Tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Regional Adminis-
trator's judgment, of carrying out the functions of an effective water quality
standards program in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the Act
and applicable regulations.
40 C.F.R. 131.8(a).
20071
514 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:495
Under the Act, the standards adopted by such a program incorporate
the uses or objectives for the waters concerned. 16 1 "The strategic man-
agement of water quality requires the setting of objectives which are to
be achieved."' 162 Such objectives, as specifically enumerated in the
Clean Water Act, include protection and propagation of fish, shellfish
and wildlife, public water supplies, recreational, industrial and agricul-
tural uses, "and also taking into consideration their use and value for
navigation."'' 63 The setting of such standards is a complex and lengthy
procedure. In the United Kingdom, the Royal Commission on Environ-
mental Pollution undertook a comprehensive review and analysis of the
setting of environmental standards and concluded that the stages of the
"policy process" for setting standards are:
" Rigorous and dispassionate investigation and
analysis;
" Deliberation and synthesis, informed by people's
values;
* Deciding whether to set a standard, and if so what
type of standard;
• Specifying the content of the standards;
* Monitoring and evaluating its effectiveness. 164
Further, the Commission noted that:
The analytical stage of the policy process has several
complementary and closely inter-related components:
" Scientific assessment;
" Analysis of technological options;
" Assessment of risk and uncertainty;
" Economic appraisal; and
° Analysis of implementation issues, including the geo-
graphical scope of standards. 165
B. TRIBAL APPLICATIONS UNDER SECTION 518
Multiple levels of communications are required between tribes,
neighboring states, other local governments, and EPA when tribes apply
for treatment as states. The state or tribe advancing a particular water
quality program must hold public hearings and solicit public comment on
161 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c)(2)(A) (2002).
162 WILLIAM HOWARTH & DONALD McGILLIVRAY, WATER POLLUTION AND WATER
QUALITY LAW 799 (2001).
163 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c)(2)(A) (2002).
164 Setting Environmental Standards, Twenty-First Report (Royal Commission on Envi-
ronmental Pollution, London, England) Oct. 1998, at 129-30.
165 Id. at 130.
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its proposed program.' 66 The public comment process is briefly de-
scribed in City of Albuquerque v. Browner:
[P]ublic participation in the establishment of water qual-
ity standards occurs when states and tribes review or re-
vise water quality standards. All comments submitted to
a state or tribe during the comment period become part
of the administrative record and are reviewed by the
EPA in determining whether to approve the state's or
tribe's proposed standards. Consequently, the purpose of
public notice and comment under the APA is satisfied
under the Clean Water Act without requiring the EPA to
receive additional comments. 167
EPA does not appear to consider comments from adjacent states or
local governments on the TAS application itself. Rather it only considers
their comments regarding jurisdictional issues that may arise over the
waters or from the water quality programs. 168
Such issues are potentially the most litigated and contentious aspect
of TAS. 169 States have opposed tribal jurisdiction over standards for res-
ervation waters since Congress amended the Clean Water Act to include
treatment-as-states for tribes under sections 518(e) and 303(c). 1 70 Sec-
tion 518(e) confers upon tribes a degree of sovereignty in preserving any
culturally or historically significant use of the reservation waters.171
States, unfortunately, may view tribal water quality programs as an im-
position on their prerogatives, or regard tribal jurisdiction over the waters
as interfering with their own jurisdiction.
For such disputes, EPA and the CWA provide a dispute resolution
framework between tribes and states.172 EPA's Regional Administrator,
after determining that criteria are met to become involved, will solicit
public comment as appropriate, and may appoint a neutral mediator or
arbitrator to resolve the dispute. 17 3 Such a resolution may be satisfying
under many circumstances, but the prospect of a long fight is understand-
ably unappealing to many tribes.
166 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1).
167 97 F.3d 415, 425 (10th Cir. 1996).
168 Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2005).
169 Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001); Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d
415 (10th Cir. 1996).
170 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c), 1377(e).
171 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c), 1377(e).
172 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.7.
173 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.7(d), (f).
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V. THE SURVIVAL OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRIBAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY
When the Marshall Court decided Johnson v. M'Intosh,174 Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,175 and Worcester v. Georgia176 in the 1820s and
1830s, "the laws and treaties of the United States contemplated that In-
dian territory would be completely separate from the state," 177 but did
not take a firm stance on whether the tribes had inherent sovereignty. 178
In Johnson v. M'Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the court,
determined that Indians had a right to their land, but this right was
subordinate to the United States' title to the lands. 179 In Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, held
that the Cherokee Nation, and other Indian tribes, were domestic depen-
dent nations rather than foreign nations. 180 In Worcester v. Georgia,
Marshall again wrote the opinion of the court, this time reversing the
174 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
175 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
176 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
177 L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignly at the Millennium, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 809, 818 (1996).
178 Id. at 818-22.
179 Marshall wrote:
[The original inhabitants'] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to
their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent na-
tions, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle,
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574. He also wrote:
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by
which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold, and assert in them-
selves, the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have main-
tained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree
of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.
An absolute, must be an exclusive title, or at least a title which excludes all others
not compatible with it. All our institutions recognize the absolute title of the crown,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognize the absolute title of the
crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an absolute and complete
title in the Indians.
Id. at 587-88.
180 According to Marshall:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore,
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by
a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether those
tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can,
with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, per-
haps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
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State of Georgia's conviction of a white man by a Georgia court under
penal codes outlawing residence in the Cherokee Nation and striking
down the Georgia law under which he was convicted.' 8'
The rights and duties conferred upon the tribes by these decisions
did not explore sovereignty to the extent that later courts would.' 82 The
courts did not need to consider whether tribes had jurisdiction over non-
nonmembers or the extent of their sovereignty because geographic and
demographic realities did not require such a determination. 183 Today,
that is no longer the case. Tribes and states share waters, and courts have
delved into the controversial area of tribal sovereignty more deeply; for
all purposes, including water law, the thinking that guided the justices
who decided this trilogy of cases no longer controls the courts.'
84
A century later, the Court revisited sovereignty and tribal jurisdic-
tion. In Williams v. Lee, 185 the court considered whether an Arizona
court had jurisdiction to hear a suit between a non-native store owner and
his Navajo customers on the reservation. 186 The Supreme Court held
that the Arizona Courts did not have that jurisdiction. 187 The unanimous
181 Marshall stated:
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of
the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its
right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A
weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of
one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing
to be a state .... The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the
acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is,
by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61.
182 Gould asserts:
Taken together, [McIntosh, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester] delineate the nature
and extent of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. Tribes are domestic dependent
nations whose right to occupy their lands is subject to the 'ultimate domain' of the
federal government; they may not form treaties with foreign nations, but may govern
their affairs without interference from the states, except when limited by treaties or
by the acts of Congress.
Gould, supra note 177, at 817.
183 Id. at 820. Nonetheless, as Gould details, two justices, Johnson dissenting in Chero-
kee Nation and Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 143-48 (1810) and M'Lean in Worcester, 31 U.S.
at 560-61, did discuss tribal sovereignty over non-members. Id. at 820-21. Both concluded
that there were limits to tribal sovereignty: Johnson concluded tribes had sovereignty only over
members and no territorial sovereignty, and M'Lean concluded that tribes could only maintain
their sovereignty while they were separate from non-tribal members. Id.
184 As Gould points out, this mode of thought would not work today as it did then when
"only a fraction of the country had been settled." Id. at 819.
185 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
186 Id. at 218.
187 Id. at 222.
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Court's holding meant that tribes had inherent sovereignty unless Con-
gress took it away. 188
This decision was modified in the landmark case for Indian law,
Montana v. United States.1 89 In Montana, the Crow Tribe of Montana
sought to prohibit non-Indians from hunting and fishing on reservation
lands.' 90 At the same time, the state of Montana claimed authority to
regulate the hunting and fishing activities of non-Indians within the res-
ervation.19' The Supreme Court held that the Crow treaties and federal
trespass statute did not give the Tribe jurisdiction over land owned by
non-Indians. t92 Additionally, the Court determined that inherent tribal
sovereign power does not extend to regulation of nonmembers on land
owned by nonmembers except (a) when nonmembers enter into consen-
sual relationships with the tribe or its members or (b) when non-Indian's
actions have a direct effect on the health and welfare of the tribe, in
which case tribes may exercise civil authority over the conduct of such
non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation.1 93 The Court's opinion
eliminated the once-necessary "appeal to inherent sovereignty as a basis
for a tribe's civil regulatory jurisdiction."' 194 Although later decisions
confirmed the health and welfare exception for tribal government, they
narrowed the scope of this exception.' 95
In the twenty-six years since the Montana decision, the Supreme
Court has decided a variety of cases regarding the extent of tribal sover-
eignty; in all those years, it "has never decided a case in favor of a tribe
on the basis of health and welfare."' 196 Instead, subsequent cases have
188 Id.; see also Gould, supra note 177, at 823.
189 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
190 Id. at 547.
191 Id. at 549.
192 Id. at 555-57.
193 Id. at 555.
194 Regina Cutler, To Clear the Muddy Waters: Tribal Regulatory Authority Under Sec-
tion 518 of the Clean Water Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 721, 728 (1999).
195 See, e.g., id. at 730-31 (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)).
196 James M. Grijalva, The Tribal Sovereign as Citizen: Protecting Indian Country Health
and Welfare Through Federal Environmental Citizen Suits, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 33, 36
(2006). Grijalva goes on to explain that:
[T]he Supreme Court] has consistently rejected tribes' claims across a broad range of
subjects, including the power to prescribe general zoning requirements, impose wild-
life management restrictions, tax businesses serving tribal citizens and other reserva-
tion residents and visitors, decide wrongful death cases arising from car accidents on
reservation roads, and decide property damage cases arising from the on-reservation
conduct of state officials. In each case, the Court acknowledged the general subject
matter implicated legitimate tribal welfare interests, but found these interests inade-
quately impacted by the on-reservation activities of non-members. Simple threats to
tribal health or welfare were insufficient; the real question was whether the Court
felt tribal control over the activity was necessary to protect tribal self-govern-
ment .... [T]he Court seems to expect evidentiary proof of an actual, direct and
significant connection with the specific non-Indian activity at issue.
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divested tribes of their jurisdiction and further diminished tribal sover-
eignty.' 97 Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, the three circuit
courts that have heard TAS challenges by states have all decided in favor
of tribes (and EPA) by relying to a large extent on the health and welfare
exception. 198
B. TRIBAL JURISDICTION, EPA, AND THE COURTS
Denise Fort points out that recognizing tribes as equivalent to states
increases the potential for inter-jurisdictional disputes at the state level
ten-fold. 199 This claim is disturbing because "[i]nterstate waters have
been a font of controversy since the founding of the Nation. '200 This
prospective contentiousness is in the context of the frequent occurrence
of jurisdictional confrontations between tribes and states.20' Therefore,
"American Indians have reason to be suspicious of intergovernmental
agreements. o202
1. City of Albuquerque v. Browner 20 3
In December 1992, EPA approved the water quality standards of the
Pueblo Indian Tribe of Isleta, New Mexico. 2°4 This was the first such
approval of a tribe's water quality standards, 20 5 and it prompted the first
major court challenge to Indian water quality standards, City of Albu-
querque v. Browner.206 The City of Albuquerque challenged EPA's ap-
proval of the Pueblo of Isleta's water quality standards on numerous
Id. at 36-37.
197 See Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword: Tribal Civil Regulatory Juris-
diction Under the Clean Water Act After United States v. Lara, 35 Envtl. L. 471, 477 (2005).
198 Tweedy asserts:
[D]espite the Supreme Court's increasingly narrow reading of the so-called Montana
exceptions and an EPA pledge to interpret the TAS provisions according to evolving
case law, EPA has ameliorated this burden somewhat by effectively creating a pre-
sumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction under the CWA, because of the obviously
strong potential for water quality to directly affect a tribe's health and welfare and
the fact that the threat posed to tribal health and welfare is serious and substantial.
[Id.]
199 Denise D. Fort, State and Tribal Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act:
A Case Study, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 771, 772 (1995). This is an estimate based on the five
hundred fifty-three tribes recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on EPA's mailing list.
Id. at n.3.
200 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 98 (1992).
201 Royster & Fausett, supra note 125, at 582.
202 John E. Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through Intergovernmental Agreements: The
Pros and Cons of Negotiated Settlements, in INDIAN WATER 1985: COLLECTED ESSAYS 25, 25
(Christine L. Miklas & Steven J. Shupe ed., 1986).
203 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
204 Id. at 419.
205 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs 563 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2006).
206 97 F.3d at 418-19.
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grounds. 207 EPA had set permit discharge limits for waste treatment fa-
cilities to satisfy state water quality standards. Subsequently, the City of
Albuquerque filed suit because EPA had sought to revise the city's
NPDES permit to meet the Isleta Pueblo's water quality standards.20 8
Although it acknowledged the 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act
authorizingEPA to treat tribes as states,20 9 the city contended that 33
U.S.C. § 1377 did not allow tribes to establish water quality standards
more stringent than those imposed by federal law, nor did it extend those
tribal standards beyond reservation boundaries. 210 However, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that tribes could adopt standards that
were more stringent than those promulgated by the federal govern-
ment.211 Additionally, the court concluded that EPA had the authority to
require the City to comply with such standards in its discharge permit.212
This decision prompted unfavorable comment.213 A particular ob-
jection was that the standard for arsenic established by the Pueblo was
below that naturally occurring in the river in which the City discharged
its wastewater. 214 As commentator Cyndi Mojtabi observed:
An arsenic standard that is below natural levels regulates
constituents naturally preexisting in the waters of the
United States, not just added pollutants. Thus, approval
of an arsenic standard that is below the natural levels of
water constituents within waters of the United States is
in excess of the CWA's limitations.215
Since the Clean Water Act regulates pollution from human activi-
ties, argued Ms. Mojtabi, such a standard is beyond its scope. 216 Ms.
Mojtabi also notes that in this particular case the Pueblo standard was a
thousand times stricter than the federal Safe Drinking Water Standard. 217
207 Id. at 419.
208 Id.
209 See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1377).
210 Browner, 97 F.3d at 421.
211 Id. at 423.
212 Id. at 422-23.
213 See, e.g., Cyndi Mojtabi, Case Note, Arsenic and Old Lace: The EPA Should Not
Have Approved a Water Quality Standard for Aarsenic that Is Below Natural Background
Levels in City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 997 (1995).
214 See id. at 1001.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1016.
217 Id. at 998.
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2. Montana v. EPA 2 18
In Montana v. EPA, the State of Montana opposed the decision of
EPA to grant TAS status to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
proposing to develop water quality standards. 2 19 In particular, the state
objected to the Tribes being empowered to control sources of pollutants
discharged from land owned by non-members. 220 This latter objection
raised questions as to the tribe's "inherent power," a concept "developed
by the Supreme Court to define when tribes may engage in nonconsen-
sual regulation of activities of non-members." '22 1
To demonstrate authority over the activities of non-
members on non-Indian fee lands, EPA requires a tribe
to show that the regulated activities affect "the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe." The potential impacts of regulated activi-
ties on the tribe must be "serious and substantial. 222
The Court conceded that the Supreme Court's "fractured decision"
in Brendale left some confusion over the correct standard to apply in
determining the effect of the activities.223 It nevertheless affirmed that
EPA had correctly determined that the potential impact of the activities
of the non-nonmembers posed such serious and substantial threats that
regulation by the tribes was essential. 224 The Court therefore affirmed
"that EPA's regulations pursuant to which the Tribe's TAS authority was
granted are valid as reflecting appropriate delineation and application of
inherent Tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting non-
members." 225
3. Wisconsin v. EPA
In 1994, the Mole Lake Band of the Sokaogon Chippewa Commu-
nity applied to EPA for TAS status under the Clean Water Act.226 The
State of Wisconsin opposed their application on the grounds that the state
was sovereign over the navigable waters of Wisconsin. 227 "Nevertheless,
218 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
219 Id. at 1138.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1139 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981)).
222 Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (citing Amendments to the Water Quality
Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,877
(1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131)).
223 Montana, 137 F.3d at 1140-41 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)).
224 Id. at 1140-41.
225 Id. at 1141.
226 Wisconsin v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 266 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2001).
227 Id.
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after elaborate administrative proceedings, on September 29, 1995, EPA
approved the Band's application, finding that the tribe had satisfied all of
the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 131.8."228 The court concluded that
EPA's approval of the Band's TAS status was reasonable and consistent
with the law:
Because the Band has demonstrated that its water re-
sources are essential to its survival, it was reasonable for
the EPA, in line with the purposes of the Clean Water
Act and the principles of Montana, to allow the tribe to
regulate water quality on the reservation, even though
the power entails some authority over off-reservation
activities. 229
C. A POTENTIAL FOR MORE LITIGATION
In these three cases the Court upheld tribal authority as approved by
EPA. In each case, state objections to tribal authority to establish water
quality standards prompted litigation. No legal challenges appear to
have been made because of conflicts over TMDLs in watersheds that
include Indian country. Still, the following hypothetical illustrates that
such challenges are readily foreseeable:
Assume that a waterbody, equally shared by state juris-
dictions A and B, is impaired by an excess amount of
phosphorus. Measurements show that the total average
annual loading of phosphorus is 50,000 kg. This total
comprises 32,000 kg that originates from farms lying en-
tirely within State A and producing animal products in-
cluding beef and milk. Additionally, point source
discharges lying entirely within state B amount to 8,000
kg. Further, assume that the water quality criterion for
phosphorus is 20tgm/l.
A TMDL calculation shows that to achieve the water
quality criterion for phosphorus it is necessary to reduce
the load of phosphorus annually delivered into the water
body annually by 10,000 kg.230 This means that in the
unlikely event that all 8,000 kg could be removed from
the point sources in state B, it would still be necessary to
reduce the loading by 2,000 kg coming from state A.
However, it is economically desirable to take the relative
228 Id.
229 Id. at 750.
230 The EPA acts reasonably when it allows TMDLs to be calculated on an annual basis.
See Friends of the Earth v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (2004).
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costs of load reduction from different sources into ac-
count. Reducing the loading of phosphorus from farms
is likely to be far less costly than removing phosphorus
through wastewater treatment.
Therefore, states A and B will need to work together to
achieve an equitable remedy. In order for the waterbody
to be fully restored, neither state may decline to take re-
medial action. Hence, the potential for conflict exists
since one state may not want to take the necessary
measures.
This extremely simplified example also demonstrates the challenges
that may arise when one of the bargaining "states" is a tribe. Of course,
there may be differences in the formulation and definition of standards,
and as a result, standards may be mutually inconsistent or incompatible.
This is especially likely when tribes adopt standards intended to meet
their cultural objectives. 23' Thus, the application of section 303 may
challenge tribal cultural sovereignty, as states, tribes and the federal gov-
ernment begin to negotiate TMDLs.
The issue of preemption is a matter of balancing tribal and state
interests. In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,232 the Supreme
Court stated:
State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of fed-
eral law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal
and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the
State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the asser-
tion of State authority.233
Where both the state and tribal interests arise under the auspices of
the Clean Water Act, it is unclear how the balance will prevail. How-
ever, as Feldman states, "Despite congressional fluctuations, states have
consistently attempted to exercise jurisdiction in Indian country. ' 234 As
Montana and Wisconsin demonstrate, states often determine that it is in
their interest to resist the extension of tribal authorities over the activities
231 For example, the Grand Portage Reservation standards provide for Wild Rice Areas-
a stream, river, lake, wetland or impoundment, or portion thereof, historically or with the
potential to be vegetated with wild rice. GRAND PORTAGE BAND OF CHIPPEWA, GRAND PORT-
AGE RESERVATION WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 10 (2005) (rev. 2006), available at http://
www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes/grand-portage-band.pdf. Some tribes,
such as the Pueblo of Acoma, prescribe ceremonial uses of the water. See PUEBLO OF ACOMA,
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS, 16 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/stan-
dards/wqslibrary/tribes/acoma.pdf.
232 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
233 Id. at 334.
234 Feldman, supra note 132, at 561.
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of non-members 235 and off-reservation activities. 236 States may believe
they have a strengthened legal position when their watershed plans, pre-
pared under the Clean Water Act section 303, already incorporate desired
controls over the polluting effects of those activities.
Boundaries of reservations sever watersheds.2 37 As Janet Baker in-
dicates, potential difficulty exists where the protection of tribal water
uses requires that expensive management measures be adopted by non-
tribal dischargers upstream. 238 Section 518 of the Clean Water Act sug-
gests that Congress clearly anticipated such disputes between states and
tribes. Section 518 states in pertinent part:
The Administrator shall, in promulgating such regula-
tions [which specify how Indian tribes shall be treated as
States for purposes of this chapter] consult affected
States sharing common water bodies and provide a
mechanism for the resolution of any unreasonable conse-
quences that may arise as a result of differing water
quality standards that may be set by States and Indian
tribes located on common bodies of water. Such mecha-
nism shall provide for explicit consideration of relevant
factors including, but not limited to, the effects of differ-
ing water quality permit requirements on upstream and
downstream dischargers, economic impacts, and present
and historical uses and quality of the waters subject to
such standards. 239
235 A considerable body of with the issue of regulation of non-members, especially with
respect to which entity can apply taxation. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645 (2001) (holding that the Montana exceptions were not applicable); Montana v. Black-
feet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, (1985) (holding that State of Montana could not tax Indian tribe's
royalty interests under oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees pursuant to Indian Min-
eral Leasing Act); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980) (holding that imposition of state cigarette and sales taxes on on-reservation
purchases by nonmembers was valid, and that state lawfully assumed civil and criminal juris-
diction over reservations); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980)
(holding state taxes preempted by federal law); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, (1976)
(holding that a state cannot impose taxes on Indians on-reservation absent congressional intent
otherwise); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (appearing to
assume that states have power unless preempted by federal law in holding that state law ap-
plies in Indian country under two conditions: first, that it does not interfere with tribal self-
government, and second, that non-Indians are involved); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (holding that imposition of state tax on Indian tribe
would be inconsistent with federal statutes applicable to Indians on reservation).
236 See supra Part V.B.2-3.
237 Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Standards: Are There Any Limits?, 7 DuKE
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 367, 367 (1996).
238 Id.
239 Clean Water Act, § 518(e)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(3) (2002).
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Clearly, the services of this mechanism are imperative where dispar-
ities in standards and different regulatory positions are likely to be ap-
plied to upstream and downstream discharges, as is readily anticipated
when watershed TMDLs are developed by neighboring states and tribes.
Further, it seems prudent for tribes to disfavor court actions to re-
solve state-tribal disputes, as it is likely the legal resolution would align
with state interests. As David Getches points out, "[t]he Supreme Court
has made radical departures from the established principles of Indian
law."' 240 Getches further states that Indian cases are used by the Court,
among other things, as a "crucible" to further commitments to protect
state interests. 241 Tribes, therefore, are understandably wary of using the
courts to protect their interests. 242
Though states are not often inclined to wage their inter-state envi-
ronmental battles in the courts, litigation may be more appealing when
their dispute is with a tribe. For example, William Hines notes that states
rarely resort to the courts to resolve their differences regarding water
pollution.243 Rather, they prefer to seek solutions through negotiation
and cooperation. 244 Hines also recognizes the importance of uniform
standards and enforcement procedures as a condition of interstate agree-
ments.245 Unfortunately, reticence to employ legal measures does not
typically occur where one of the disputants is a tribe rather than another
state.
VI. PROGRESS TO DATE
A. FAILURES AND SUCCESSES
1. When Tribes Do Participate, the Resulting Policies Are
Impressive
Water quality standards of tribes with accepted programs propose
high quality in the waterbodies and ambitious objectives. Their water
quality objectives, which may include cultural beneficial uses or ceremo-
nial and religious water uses. 246 Many of the policy statements represent
240 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MIN. L. REV. 267, 267 (2001).
241 Id. at 360.
242 See infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text.
243 N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part
II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IOWA L. REv. 432, 434 (1966). How-
ever, for an example of a case in which two states did litigate an environmental issue, see
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992), involving a dispute about the validity of an EPA
issued discharge permit held by a sewage treatment plant.
244 Hines, supra note 243, at 434.
245 Id.
246 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 131.35 (2005) (detailing water quality standards adopted by the
Colville Confederated Tribes Indian Reservation); BIG PINE PAurE TRIBE OF THE OWENS
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a rigorous approach to water quality protection. For example, the policy
of the Miccosukee Tribe states:
The Tribe, recognizing the complexity of water quality
management and the necessity to temper regulatory ac-
tions with technological progress and social and eco-
nomic well-being of Tribal members, vows that there
will be no compromise with respect to discharges of pol-
lutants which constitute a valid hazard to human health
or the preservation of the Everglades ecosystem con-
tained within the Water Conservation Area 3-A and
Everglades National Park. Furthermore, the Tribe will
seek to use the best environmental information available
when making decisions on the effects of chronically and
acutely toxic substances and carcinogenic, mutagenic,
and teratogenic substances. 247
The Fort Peck Tribes also use biological criteria in their water qual-
ity standards based on reference conditions determined by monitoring. 248
These bio-criteria are based on the types and numbers of plants and
aquatic animals expected to be present in the stream. 249 The Hoopa Val-
ley Tribe similarly includes in its statement of Beneficial Uses:
Virtually all activities for both consumptive and non-
consumptive uses of the Reservation waters center on
satisfaction of domestic, aquatic, industrial, irrigation,
recreational and cultural needs. Additional quantities of
water are expected to be required for all consumptive
and nonconsumptive uses over the next several years.
Specifically, there has been a marked increase over the
last several years in concern over some of the non-con-
sumptive uses that water can serve, notably the growing
importance given to the habitat for anadromous fish,
principally chinook salmon, coho salmon and steelhead
trout. More interest is also being shown in the benefit of
water-orientated recreational activities. Other non-con-
sumptive beneficial uses of growing concern include
VALLEY, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS, BIG PINE INDIAN RESERVATION (2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes.html.
247 MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLA., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CODE SUBTI-
TLE B: WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR SURFACE WATERS OF THE MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF
INDIANS OF FLORIDA 3 (1997) (amended 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/
standards/wqslibrary/tribes/fl_4_miccosukee.pdf.
248 ASSINIBOINE & Sioux TRIBES OF THE FORT PECK INDIAN RESERVATION, WATER QUAL-
rTY STANDARDS 4, available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes/
fort_peck_8_wqs.pdf.
249 Id.
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cultural uses, wildlife habitat, esthetics, wild rivers, and
special Native American fisheries.250
Those tribes that have gained approval from EPA demonstrate so-
phisticated technical command of their water quality interests. This pro-
vides a model for those tribes yet to seek such approval from EPA.
2. Tribal Participation: Too Low After 20 Years?
According to its listing under "Tribal Water Quality Standards ap-
proved by EPA," to date EPA has accorded thirty-two tribes a status
equivalent to states. 25' This number is less than 10% of the 561 tribal
entities recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs by virtue of their
status as Indian tribes. 252 There are a number of possible reasons for
this. TAS presents several problems to tribes including: legal threats (as
evidenced by Albuquerque v. Browner, Montana v. EPA, and Wisconsin
v. EPA) and consequent threats to tribal sovereignty; 253 lack of capac-
ity-a water quality standards program requires money and infrastruc-
ture;254 differences in cultural conceptions of the environment; 25 5 and a
wide variety of other uncertainties.
The phrase treatment-as-state is an affront to tribal sovereignty, as
well. EPA has decided to minimize the use of the term treatment-as-
state." The Agency regards the term as somewhat misleading and per-
haps offensive to tribes. 256 Therefore to the extent possible, EPA has
amended existing regulations so as to discontinue use of the term treat-
ment-as-state.257 Nevertheless, since this phrase is included in several
250 HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE, WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN, HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN
RESERVATION, 25 (2001) [hereinafter HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE WATER QUALITY CONTROL
PLAN], available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes/
hoopa-valley.pdf.
251 See EPA, Tribal Water Quality Standards, http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/stan-
dards/wqslibrary/tribes.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2008).
252 Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the U.S. Bureau of
Indian Affairs Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,194-98 (Nov. 25, 2005). In its Amendments to the
Water Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, EPA
determined that approximately two hundred seventy-five tribes were "potentially eligible for
treatment as States under the standards program." EPA 1989 Indian Policy Amendments, 54
Fed. Reg. 39,098 (Sept. 22, 1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). EPA predicted that
"roughly 50 to 60 Tribes will ultimately apply to be treated as States for purposes of water
quality standards, with only about 20 of those applying during the first year." Id. These
predictions are much higher than the actual numbers. See also Mark A. Bilut, Note, Tribal
Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 887, 888 (1994).
253 See supra Part V.B.
254 See infra notes 277-86 and accompanying text.
255 See infra notes 287-95 and accompanying text.
256 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA Tribal Policy and Initiatives 19, available at
www.epa.gov/indian/resource/modules/module3.pdf.
257 Id.
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statutes, its continued use is sometimes unavoidable. 25 8 Because it is still
used, tribes may find the language threatening and may feel that by ap-
plying for treatment-as-state, they are putting their sovereignty at risk
and potentially exposing themselves to more federal or state encroach-
ment on their sovereignty.
If EPA does grant a tribe TAS, states, local government, and indus-
try may oppose tribal standards.259 Tribal standards, as evidenced by the
cases and plans mentioned earlier, are often more stringent than state
standards, and states resist complying with them because they may pose
a threat to industry or require the state to expend resources to comply
with tighter standards. 260 According to Rodgers, "[the] revival of water
pollution law in Indian country is not universally admired. In fact, it is
frequently resented. Each and every tribal delegation runs into stiff op-
position-invariably from an offended state, often from polluters who
have prospered in the shadows of the status quo. '2 61 Tribes are certainly
aware of this, and, as a result, may legitimately fear that any attempt to
create a water quality standards plan will be met by vocal opposition and
perhaps even a legal challenge.
Given the likelihood of a state, local government, or another af-
fected party bringing a lawsuit if a tribe adopts a water quality standards
plan more stringent than the non-tribal program, tribes must assess
whether they are capable of fighting such a battle. Of course, tribes typi-
cally have less capacity to defend themselves in court. They have fewer
resources to devote to litigation than do state governments or industry,
and, as described above, tribes may often anticipate bias in the judicial
system.262
When a state challenges a tribe's plan, it is also likely to challenge
that tribe's right to that land or its treaty with the United States, as both
of those are factors EPA is called upon to consider in granting TAS.263
While some tribes may have treaties with the federal government that
give them a strong position for their TAS applications, other tribes may
have weaker grounds upon which their sovereign authority rests.264
These tribes may have more difficulty in convincing a court that their
EPA-granted jurisdiction over the waters is appropriate. 265 These tribes
258 Id.
259 See Rodgers, supra note 107, at 820 ("There is nothing in the early experience of
section 518 to quell the suspicion that it is sponsoring a rebellion in the pollution-harboring
preferences if "states as states.").
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 See supra Part V.A.
263 Clean Water Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2001); see also Tweedy, supra note 197,
at 480.
264 Tweedy, supra note 197, at 480.
265 Id.
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may, therefore, be less likely to pursue TAS for water quality standards
programs.
Courts may also determine that the basis for the tribe's seeking ap-
proval, i.e., the presumption that jurisdictional authority over the waters
is necessary for the health and welfare of the tribe, is invalid. 266 Worse
yet, a court might hold that that section 518 is completely invalid if the
court determines that tribes should have no authority over non-
members. 267
Each venture into non-Indian courts brings extravagant
response. No state that brings a lawsuit runs serious risk
that a court might hold that the state does not exist, that
its territory is but a fraction of that imagined .... Tribes,
by contrast, are exposed to these risks all the time. 268
This means that a tribe might be forced to adopt a conservative posi-
tion with respect to its boundaries, or possibly even have to defend its
authority over its entire reservation. 269 These threats to tribal sover-
eignty operate as deterrents to tribes pursuing TAS for water quality
standards programs, and pose a tremendous threat to tribal water quality,
as well as the water quality of their entire watershed. 270
In addition to the legal and bureaucratic wrangling tribes may en-
counter in seeking sovereignty over their waters, tribes may face political
opposition. In 1995, when the Republican-controlled House passed an
amendment that would have limited tribal authority and denied authority
to the tribes to regulate non-members for purposes of the Clean Water
Act, undermining tribal control over the waters within their bounda-
ries.271 Dean Suagee argues that "opponents of tribal sovereignty can be
expected to press their case in Congress. '272 Here, they did, and another
incident confirms Suagee's position.
Another example of such a political roadblock for tribes seeking
sovereignty over their waters occurred in August 2005, when U.S. Sena-
tor James Inhofe of Oklahoma, the former Chairman of the Environment
and Public Works Committee overseeing EPA, placed a midnight rider
into the Transportation Reauthorization Bill.273 The clause required
266 Id. at 477.
267 Id.
268 Rodgers, supra note 107, at 823.
269 Id.
270 See Grijalva, supra note 196, at 34.
271 H.R. 961, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Dean B. Suagee, Clean Water and Human
Rights in Indian Country, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 46, 47 (1996).
272 Suagee, supra note 271, at 47.
273 Tony Thornton, Indian Leaders Hear Complaints About Legislation, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 2, 2005, at 1 IA; About Senator Inhofe-Biography, http://inhofe.senate.
gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutSenatorlnhofe.Biography (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
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Oklahoma tribes to negotiate with the state before determining their
water quality standards and effectively eliminated the "sovereignty"
granted Oklahoma tribes under the CWA.274 Senator Inhofe did not in-
form EPA, any tribes, or the governor of Oklahoma that he was going to
include this provision in the transportation legislation; only the
Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association knew that the Senator was
going to insert it.275 Several editorials applauded Senator Inhofe for his
rider (albeit at the expense of Oklahoma Indian tribes receiving the bene-
fits of the CWA) though others lambasted him for it.276
Apart from the legal and political challenges created by TAS, many
tribes lack the infrastructure and finances to administer a water plan.
While tribes may regulate with or without the involvement of EPA, "ei-
ther programmatic approach requires substantial commitments of tribal
and federal staff time and resources necessary for creating required ad-
ministrative infrastructure. 2 77
The CWA necessitates that a tribe demonstrate its ability to admin-
ister a water quality standards program; this requires the tribe to prove
that it has the infrastructure to do so. 278 Environmental management is
expensive, and requires skilled employees and costly infrastructure. 279
According to Grijalva, "[m]any tribes have no established environmental
agency, administrative procedure laws, formal court systems, or other
complementary governmental functions. '280 This puts tribes at a tremen-
dous disadvantage in terms of developing and running a water quality
standards program.
Tribes may consider water quality standards programs and other en-
vironmental programs too expensive to implement.28' EPA does provide
resources for tribes to plan, develop and administer water quality stan-
dards programs, but the resources EPA provides may be insufficient for
many tribes. EPA provides grants for tribes to establish environmental
274 See Thorton, supra note 273, at 1 A; see also Highway Bill May Limit Tribes' Ability
to Exceed State Environment Rules, INSIDE FUELS AND VEHICLES, VOL. 4, No. 16 (Aug. 11,
2005); Jim Meyers, EPA Unaware ofInhofe Provision, TULSA WORLD, August Aug. 13, 2005,
at All, available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articlelD=050813_Ne_
A l IEPAun26591.
275 Thornton, supra note 273.
276 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 274.
277 Grijalva, supra note 196, at 34.
278 See Tweedy, supra note 197, at 479.
279 See Grijalva, supra note 196, at 33-34.
280 James M. Grijalva, Where Are the Tribal Water Quality Standards and TMDLs?, 18
Nat. Res. & Env't 63, 67 (Fall 2003).
281 "Because the issue of a clean environment is often framed as being in conflict with
economic success, many tribes have viewed environmental action as something beyond their
reach." Allan Kanner, Ryan Casey, & Barrett Ristroph, New Opportunities for Native Ameri-
can Tribes to Pursue Environmental and Natural Resource Claims, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 155, 157 (2003).
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agencies and regulations. 282 EPA offers funding to assist in the develop-
ment and implementation of plans that address water and other environ-
mental concerns. 283
By following the guidelines outlined by the CWA and applying for
funding from the federal government for the necessary historical and sci-
entific research to support their standards, tribes can begin to establish
water programs. 284 Tribes that have TAS have an advantage because
they are eligible for more funding than those tribes who apply for the
same grants without TAS. 2 85 However, TAS may be unappealing for
tribes with the necessary infrastructure or finances to develop such a pro-
gram because it requires submitting to the cumbersome and potentially
degrading application process. 286
A further issue complicating tribal applications for TAS is that the
standards by which water quality programs are judged may be different
from or even inconsistent with native perspectives. The process outlined
by section 303 for setting water standards-imposing discharge require-
ments on point sources and managing nonpoint sources on the land-
means that tribal environmental management becomes in effect contin-
gent on Anglo-American norms. 287 David Getches has observed that
"[t]he entire reserved water rights doctrine is not based on Indian values
but on federal legislative purposes. '288
The theme of native perspectives on the environment is popular
among academics. Getches further notes that the "integrity of land,
water, and the natural world is at the heart of nearly all tribal cultural and
282 EPA provides General Assistance Program grants and grants under various sections of
the CWA. Indian Environmental General Assistance Program Act of 1992 § 502(b), 42
U.S.C. § 4368b(b) (1992); see, e.g., Clean Water Act, § 319(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (2002).
283 See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)(1).
284 According to the GAO report, between 2002 and 2004, tribal governments received
approximately $360 million in funding from the EPA for various environmental activities.
GAO REPORT, supra note 155, at 5 (2005). $253 million of that came from the Indian General
Assistance Program, the CWA, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Air Act. Id. at 21.
Specifically, EPA gave $114 million through the Indian General Assistance Program to help
tribes "plan, develop, and establish environmental protection programs" and $66 million under
the CWA for water pollution programs. Id. at 26. The remaining funds were authorized under
the Toxic Substances Control Act, the National Environmental Education Act, the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and other environmental pro-
grams. Id.
285 Though the Indian General Assistance Program does not require that tnbes have TAS,
tribes contribute less matching funds for grants under CWA section 106 if they have TAS
status. Id. at 23.
286 See id. at 20.
287 Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 226
(1996).
288 David Getches, Defending Indigenous Water Rights with the Laws of a Dominant
Culture: The Case of the United States, in LIQUID RELATIONS: CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND
LEGAL COMPLEXITY 44, 63 (Dik Roth et al. ed., 2005).
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spiritual life."'289 Angie Debo refers to the love Indians have for their
homeland as amounting to a mystical identification with it.290 Debo
quotes a leader of the Spokane tribe who stated, "I was born by these
waters. The earth here is my mother. '2 91 In contrast to wider American
culture, many Native Americans see the world in a holistic way, "that is,
as an organic or unified whole, whose parts are totally interdependent
and whose reality is greater than the sum of those parts. '2 92 Creating a
water quality standards plan consistent with both Indian cultural perspec-
tives and the requirements of section 303 poses an additional problem for
tribes that states, simply, do not have to confront.
Tribes that do confront this challenge, however, often advance bio-
logical purposes and protection that should be viewed as important.
Robert Adler criticizes the deficiency of water quality standards in pro-
viding for biological factors. 293 In this respect, tribal water quality stan-
dards may serve as valuable examples of desirable water protection
objectives to states and local government. As William Galloway states,
"[t]ribes identify with their land in ways that non-Indian society is only
beginning to understand. Tribes' love for their land could also lead to
improvements in the reservation and neighboring environments, since
they seem likely to establish more stringent standards than the surround-
ing states. '294 Whether tribes advance policy goals that reflect indige-
nous values, Anglo-American values, or a combination of the two, may
depend on the particular character of that tribe and the individuals ad-
vancing the policy.295
Many of the stereotypes, however, while they may find some basis
in individual tribes or individual tribal members, also complicate any
discussion of environmentalism and Indians because not all tribes and
tribal members share the same perspectives about the environment. 296
Nevertheless, although the federal government has imposed Anglo-
American norms, TAS gives tribes an opportunity to share their own
values and impress their own standards through the CWA and discus-
289 Id. at 63.
290 ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006).
291 Id.
292 Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Understanding, Preserving,
and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians: Human Rights, Sa-
cred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 182 (1992).
293 For example, some commentators criticize water quality standards for failing to pro-
vide biological factors. ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN, & DIANE M. CAMERON,
THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER 125 (1993).
294 Galloway, supra note 133, at 202.
295 See Tsosie, supra note 287, at 227 (describing conflicting pressures on Indian commu-
nities to act in accordance with tribal traditions and values while not seeming to evade the
mainstream regulatory system).
296 Id.
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sions with EPA and the states.297 Tribes, while they may be deterred by
the norms imposed on them through section 303, can work within those
norms to add their own value to the standards developed.
Though EPA is committed to tribal participation through TAS, even
the bureaucratic element of the application process may deter tribes. 298
The CWA statutes, EPA regulations, and EPA's handbook for tribes ap-
plying for TAS status and approval of their water quality should provide
a cohesive explanation of EPA's policy. However, the statutes, while
detailed, do not convey the details of EPA's TAS policy. 299
EPA's experience with past applications may be immensely helpful
to tribes.300 However, EPA received criticism in the GAO's report on
tribal applications for environmental programs in October 2005.30 1 The
GAO examined twenty cases from EPA Regions 6, 9, and 10, the regions
where the greatest number of approvals had occurred. 30 2 The report was
particularly critical of the delays in the process for applications. 30 3 In
one instance, EPA asked for necessary information about a tribe's water
bodies, water uses and land status twenty months after receiving the TAS
request, but EPA should have asked for this information when the tribe's
request was submitted. 3°4 In other instances, bureaucratic confusion at
EPA or changes in staff (at EPA and within tribal environmental pro-
grams) led to delays of several months or even several years. 30 5 The
GAO report, however, reveals shortcomings of those regions with the
most success administering TAS rather than an examination of the short-
comings nationwide. 30 6 The twenty cases assessed in preparation of the
report were all from the Regions 6, 9, and 10.307 Those Regions ac-
counted for 77% of the approved tribal applications under the CWA,
SDWA, and CAA. 30 8 The authors of the study met with representatives
from Indian tribes and state officials in Arizona, New Mexico,
297 See id. at 229-32.
298 See GAO REPORT, supra note 155, at 20.
299 See generally Clean Water Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2002).
300 Given the high economic costs involved in developing environmental programs, the
significant amount of time and resources required to complete an application, the difficulties
sometimes faced by tribes when attempting to navigate an unfamiliar Anglo-American system,
and the extensive delays frequently encountered in processing tribal applications, EPA's gui-
dance is tremendously important; a more explicit policy, such as the one EPA intended to
create following the GAO report, would be valuable.
301 See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 155.
302 Id. at 30.
303 Id. at "Highlights" (unnumbered page).
304 Id. at 18.
305 Id. at 18-19.
306 Id. at 30.
307 Id.
308 Id.
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Oklahoma, and Washington-states in Region 9, 6, 6, and 10,
respectively. 30 9
Apparently, the GAO did not meet with EPA administrators, tribal
leaders, or states outside those regions where TAS has been less sought
after. Region 2, for example, includes New York State, New Jersey, Pu-
erto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Cayuga Nation, the Oneida Indian
Nation, the Onondaga Nation, the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, the Seneca
Nation of Indians, the Tonawanda Band of Senecas, and the Tuscarora
Nation. 310 As of April 8, 2008, only the St. Regis Mowhawk Tribe had
an EPA-approved TAS application. 311 The Tribe applied for TAS and
was approved on October 16, 2002. 3 12 Its water quality standards were
approved by EPA in August 2007. 3 13
VIII. TAS AND SOVEREIGNTY: NO GOOD CHOICE
FOR TRIBES
In response to the October 2005 GAO report and Inhofe's interven-
tion in the TAS program, EPA decided to form the Tribal Water Program
Council. 314 The Council was designed by EPA to improve relations be-
tween states and tribes regarding water quality programs.3 15 It will facil-
itate dialogue between tribes and states regarding water quality criteria
for shared watersheds. 316 Furthermore, EPA promised tribal leaders a
guidance document for TAS programs and software to assist with the
development and implementation of their programs. 317
Despite the bureaucratic, legal, and political wrangling facing a
tribe requesting TAS, the alternative leaves the tribes with less control
over their part of the watersheds in which their reservations lie.3 18 Under
the CWA, the federal government, through EPA, has authority to control
309 Id. at 31.
3 10 Federally-Recognized Indian Nations Located in Region 2 Area, http://www.epa.gov/
region2/nations/intro.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
311 See Indian Tribal Approvals, http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/tribes/approvtable.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
312 ENvTL. DIVIsIoN, ST. REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS, AUGUST
8, 2007, at 1 (2007), http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribesl
srmt_2_%20wqs.pdf.
313 See id.
314 EPA Guidance May Speed Creation of Tribal Water, Air Standards, ENVTL. POL'Y
ALERT, June 21, 2006, Vol. 23, 'No. 13.
315 New EPA-Backed Council May Help Resolve Tribal-State Water Disputes, WATER
POL'Y REPORT, Apr. 3, 2006, Vol. 15, No. 7.
316 Id.
317 EPA Guidance May Speed Creation of Tribal Water, Air Standards, ENvTL. POL'Y
ALERT, June 21, 2006, Vol. 23, No. 13; see also EPA Guidance May Speed Creation of Tribal
Water Quality Standards, supra note 155.
318 See Royster & Fausett, supra note 125, at 602.
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pollution of surface waters. 319 EPA retains the responsibility of creating
and enforcing water quality standards for states who have not assumed
the administration and enforcement of their own standards and tribes
who have not received TAS. 320
But EPA may have the option of allowing states to include tribal
reservations in their water programs. Federal preemption of state law
applies when a federal law explicitly preempts state law or occupies the
field to the exclusion of state law. 321 When Congress authorized EPA to
treat tribes as states, it preempted state jurisdiction over tribal reserva-
tions. 322 However, there is no express language in the statutes providing
for the designation of tribes as states that would deny EPA the option of
allowing states to administer state-crafted regulations on reservation
lands. 323 Thus:
As time goes by, state regulatory authority may continue
to "creep" onto reservations [in] areas where a combina-
tion of tribal and federal inaction has resulted in "de
facto" state regulation. This regulatory void may en-
hance state claims that state intrusions into the arena of
reservation water quality standards do not affect tribal
self-government. 324
If this were to happen, tribes would risk losing their historic or cul-
turally significant uses of the water, in addition to simply relinquishing
control of those waters. Because EPA's position is essentially to ad-
vance any reasonable tribal water program within reason and because
courts have consistently upheld tribal authority to create such pro-
grams, 32 5 pursuing TAS under section 303 might be the most prudent
means of preserving tribal sovereignty over the waters and their uses.
It may be surmised that the relatively large percentage of tribes that
have not sought TAS under the CWA feel there is no over-riding incen-
tive to do so. A potentially major incentive to proceed in seeking ap-
proval would arise if states began to assumes it was in their interest to
319 See Clean Water Act §402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).
320 See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); Whitman Memorandum,
supra note 140.
321 Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the
Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995).
322 See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tnbe, 462 U.S. 324, 343-44 (1983) (holding
that where an Indian tribe with assistance from the federal government had developed a pro-
gram for the management of its reservation's natural resources, and where concurrent jurisdic-
tion by the state would interfere with or nullify that regulatory scheme, application of the
State's hunting and fishing laws to the reservation was preempted).
323 See, e.g., Clean Water Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387 (2002).
324 Kurt R. Moser, Water Quality Standards and Indian Tribes: Are Tribes Afraid of
Clean Water?, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 27, 29 (2004).
325 See, e.g., Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
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themselves establish water quality standards for tribal waters in the ab-
sence of tribal action. The continuing, significant impairment of the na-
tion's waters demonstrates the insufficiency of relying upon point source
controls. It seems persuasive that the remedy is widespread adoption of
the machinery of section 303. This will mandate control measures based
on comprehensive watershed planning and management through the ap-
plication of Total Maximum Daily Loads. "TMDL-based rules should
be thought of as an inevitable step toward a mature phase of regulation in
which all sources of water quality degradation are addressed. ' 326 "All
sources" include those within reservations.
CONCLUSION
Water rights are traditionally held to apply to a quantity of water
allocated according to the rights. However, it would seem judicious to
specify water quality in the definition of water rights. For tribes, gaining
TAS for their water quality standards programs is one way to assure ac-
cess to water quality that suits their aspirations. Unfortunately, greater
stringency in the expression of water quality standards is often seen as
grounds for opposition rather than emulation. There is a long history of
conflict between states and tribes over regulatory jurisdiction. 327
In providing for tribes to be treated as states, Congress potentially
instituted a tenfold increase in the number of states.328 This reality poses
two critical needs. . First, it is highly desirable that efforts be made to
promote a wider understanding and acceptance of the water quality stan-
dards, and consequent management measures adopted by the tribes. Sec-
ond, there is an even greater immediate need to encourage the vast
majority of tribes that have not sought TAS-status to pursue that status
through EPA. Indian communities are understandably likely to act with
caution in protecting their interests, but ultimately, those interests seem
to require achieving TAS.
Tribes have a responsibility to protect the health and welfare of their
communities through their own Water Quality Control Plans. Despite its
shortcomings, the CWA provides a framework that allows tribes to cre-
ate standards for their uses and to protect against those uses being under-
mined by non-tribal communities with whom they share their waters. As
stated in the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation, Water Quality Control
Plan, "[i]n protecting Tribal property, wildlife and natural resources with
the adoption of this Water Quality Control Plan, the Tribe is exercising
its inherent power to regulate activities that may threaten or have a direct
326 James Boyd, The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA's
New TMDL Rules, 11 DuKE ENvmn. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 41 (2001).
327 Galloway, supra note 133, at 177.
328 Fort, supra note 199, at 772
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effect on the political integrity, the economic security, and health and
welfare of the Tribe." 329 Not having plans may have more unpalatable
effects for tribes in the long-term. It is not in their interest to delay until
states feel obliged to intervene in tribal water management.
Delegation to tribal governments of all jurisdiction under
the [FWPCA] is the result most consistent with current
congressional and judicial expressions favoring tribal
self-government. Assumption of such delegation by the
tribe would prevent further encroachment by the state in
the jurisdictional voice in determining their own envi-
ronmental future and the future of areas surrounding the
reservation. 330
The legal history of environmental protection is an area that "came
to be dominated by un-kept promises and the promotion of a culture
within that area dominated by adversarialism, polarization, and dis-
trust."' 331 Treating tribes as states under the Clean Water Act requires
that domination should end. Although the CWA imposes an Anglo-
American paradigm on tribes applying for TAS, it allows tribes to protect
their waters on their terms. This adds value to the program not only for
tribes, but also potentially for states and the federal government.Tribal
management is critical because watershed protection and the develop-
ment of TMDLs and their application in practice requires the engage-
ment of all communities within it. Tribes are more likely to respect
water quality standards when they have ownership in their creation. Al-
though tribal water quality standards may be stricter than state or local
standards, they are entirely consistent with the goals of the CWA and the
need to improve the nation's waters. The holistic view of the world,
often attributed to Native Americans, is obviously a more realistic view
than a is the piecemeal approach to environmental protection. If water
quality management programs begin to reflect this holistic view it will be
a positive step toward improving the nation's blighted waters.
When Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987 to allow In-
dian tribes to receive TAS, their intent was to enhance the protection for
water's within the nation's boundaries by focusing on the quality of res-
ervation waters. This was a logical extension of the Clean Water Act, as
water quality on reservations has an impact on water quality in neighbor-
ing states. Tribes should be encouraged to take advantage of the re-
sources available to them through EPA funding and should take some
329 HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN, supra note 250, at 2.
330 Petros, supra note 109, at 63. Petros noted that in 1975 Congress was in favor of
tribal participation in a piece of federal strip mining legislation that was ultimately vetoed. Id.
at 93 n.168.
331 LAZARUS, supra note 13, at 87.
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comfort in the fact that the courts have upheld their standards when chal-
lenged. Still, too few tribes have this status. The problems that have
developed from this legislation, including bureaucratic, legal, and politi-
cal obstacles, may discourage tribes. Financial limitations and other in-
capacities may also be obstacles. This regrettable situation risks losing
potentially valuable contributions to environmental programs on the part
of tribes. The management and regulation of tribal waters could default
to the states especially given the increased need for integrated watershed
management posed by TMDLs. This outcome would not only defeat the
congressional purpose in including section 518 in its amendments to the
CWA in 1987, it would also be a defeat for tribal interests in water
resources.
